One of the new iPhone 3GS features that has received little attention this week is hardware encryption. However, from a forensics standpoint, this is probably the most significant feature of the new update. The feature is buried at the bottom of this “more features” page:
Phil Schiller also briefly mentions this feature at 1:52 of the Apple keynote.
Why Encryption on the iPhone Matters
Encryption on the iPhone matters to businesses because the iPhone can store potentially sensitive information. Among other things, forensics investigators can recover the following from iPhones (from iPhone Forensics by Jonathan Zdziarski):
- Keyboard caches containing usernames, passwords, and nearly everything typed on the iPhone.
- Screenshots of the last state of an application before the home button is pressed to return to the main menu.
- Deleted images.
- Deleted calendar entries and contacts.
- A record of the last 100 calls made.
- Viewed Google Maps images and directions.
- Browser history and caches, even when deleted.
- Deleted email messages.
- Deleted voicemail.
- Pairing records establishing which computers the iPhone was synced with.
You might think that extensive forensics experience and knowledge of the iPhone operating and file system is needed to recover this data. However, several specialized forensics tools, such as Paraben‘s Device Seizure and the Sixth Legion‘s Wolf, have automated this forensics process and can recover sensitive data from iPhones in seconds.
So it is understandable that encryption on the iPhone is a highly requested feature by corporations, according to Phil Schiller. Hardware-based encryption on the iPhone could effectively nullify forensics work on the iPhone.
Remote Wipe: A Potential Weakness
According to Schiller, hardware encryption on the iPhone 3GS enables instantaneous remote wipe. Apparently, rather than overwriting every bit as does the iPhone 3G, a remote wipe on the iPhone 3GS only overwrites the hardware encryption key, rendering all data on the iPhone unintelligible. This explains why if you later recover your iPhone 3GS, you can restore your data by enabling your MobileMe account on the iPhone, which apparently downloads the hardware encryption key to the iPhone, making the data on the iPhone readable again.
Although this feature is convenient, it does pose a potential security problem. If the hardware encryption key is hidden in the iPhone file system without being encrypted itself, then a forensics investigator could find the key and decrypt data on the iPhone. And forensics tools like a faraday cage will prevent the iPhone from receiving a remote wipe command, lengthening the window to find the encryption key indefinitely.
Of course this would require specialized knowledge of the iPhone and cryptography, but that is exactly what forensics firms like Paraben and Sixth Legion have. And their expertise is encapsulated and automated in tools like Device Seizure and Wolf, extending this ability to more general users.
So while hardware encryption on the iPhone 3GS is an interesting development, unless the encryption key is itself somehow encrypted, it will be a matter of time before the forensics community learns a way to find the key and make forensic analysis of the iPhone 3GS possible.